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“Sovereignty [is] ‘freedom that is organised 
by international law and committed to it.’”1 
 
"[T]he legal consciousness of the civilized 
world demands the recognition forthe 
individual of rights that are immune from 






Individual rights are secured by at least two legal sources: constitutional law and 
international law. The co-existence of constitutional and international law norms 
is inevitably a source of conflict: When there is a conflict between a constitutional 
provision and an international law provision, which (if any) provision should 
have the upper hand?  
Theorists thus far have argued for (and assumed the necessity of) a clear 
hierarchy between constitutional and international law. This Article argues that 
the conviction that one system of norms is superior to the other is false. Instead, 
we embrace competition between constitutional and international norms, what we 
call the "discordant parity hypothesis." It is the persistent tension and conflict 
between the two systems of norms that is necessary for recognizing and ensuring 
individual freedom. 
To establish the discordant parity hypothesis, we explore the best possible 
arguments for both the internationalists’ and for constitutionalists’ positions. We 
suggest that the argument supporting the overriding power of international law 
norms is based on the importance of the implied resulting recognition that the 
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state has a  publicly recognized duty to protect rights. The overriding power of 
constitutional norms stems from its promise to individuals of being the masters of 
their own destiny. We further argue that this is necessary for the effective exercise 
of rights. Both claims are compelling . Instead of trying to establish hierarchy 
between the claims, we embrace their equal standing and the ensuing conflict 
between them. We believe that constant tensions and conflicts between 





I. INTRODUCTION  
Individual rights are secured by at least two different legal sources: constitutional 
law and international law. The co-existence of constitutional and international law 
norms is inevitably a source of conflict: When there is a conflict between the 
scope of a right under a constitutional provision and an international law 
provision, which (if any) provision should have the upper hand? Who is (or 
should be) the final arbiter as to what rights we have? 
This Article argues that the conviction that one system of norms is superior to the 
other is false. As a matter of fact, we argue in favor of "discordant parity 
hypothesis" that embraces competition between constitutional and international 
norms. It is the persistent tension and conflict between the two systems of norms, 
each of which claims superiority, that is necessary for recognizing and ensuring 
individual freedom. 
Debates about the relations between constitutional and international law 
hark back to the emergence of the concept of the sovereign state. The 
rejection of a global order based on religion or nature and the rise of 
popular sovereignty necessarily gave rise to two conflicting theses. One 
gave primacy to the national constitution, which draws its authority from 
the people who is the only legitimate source of power, being the pouvoir 
constituant.
3
 This implied two consequences for the relationship between 
constitutional law and international law: International law is derived from 
the constitution, founded on state consent,
4
 and it stops at the states’ 
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 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, QU'EST-CE LE TIERS ETAT? (Paris, 1789) (“The nation exists prior to 
everything; it is the origin of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself. Prior to the 
nation and above the nation there is only natural law…. Not only is a nation not subject to a 
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entering into international engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty”); S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. 
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borders, incapable of intervening in states’ internal affairs.5 Hence it was 
maintained that: “The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not 
imposed by itself. "
6
 
But there is also an alternative reading of the relationship between the 
constitutional and the international that put international law as the fountainhead 
of the law. August Wilhelm Heffter wrote about a European society of states that 
was bound by a shared legal order,
7
 Georg Jellinek argued that as a member in the 
“community of states,” all states were necessarily bound by “objective 
international law,”8 and Ferdinand von Martitz proposed that sovereignty was 
“freedom that is organized by international law and committed to it.”9 Hans 
Kelsen was the first to offer a systemic elaboration of the relationship reaching 
through his pure theory of law the conclusion that constitutional law is necessarily 
derived from the international legal order.
10
 Hersch Lauterpacht grounded the 
primacy of international law on its reflection of “the universal law of humanity in 
which the individual human being, as the ultimate unit of all law, rises sovereign 
over the limited province of the State.”11  
This way or the other, the preoccupation of theorists has been to argue for (and 
often to assume the necessity of) a clear hierarchy between constitutional and 
international law. This resulted in endless debates whether “dualism” (the idea 
that state law was the source of international law) could or should concede to a 
“monist” vision of the legal system (i.e., that international law was the source of 
state law).
12
 The question was not whether one set of norms overrides the other 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 at I8 (Sep. 7) (International law “emanate[s] from the [states’] 
own free will”). 
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inTHE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 3, 13 (Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin eds.,2010) 
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Henry Dana Ed., 8thed, 1866) (“A Nation associating itself with the general society of nations, 
thereby recognizes a law common to all nations by which its international relations are to be 
regulated.”). 
8 Georg Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen 92-96 (1882), as lucidly explained in 
Jochen von Bernstorf, Georg Jellinek and the Origins of Liberal Constitutionalism in International 
Law, 4 GOETTINGEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 659, 672-3 (2012). 
9
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International Law 1, 47 (1946). See Roman Kwiecień, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht’s Idea of State 
Sovereignty – Is It Still Alive? 13 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY LAW REVIEW 23 (2011). 
12 Hans Kelsen, Introduction, supra note 11, at 107–55; GEORGES SCELLE, PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES 
GENS: PRINCIPES ET SYSTEMATIQUE (Dalloz 2008)(1932); Armin von Bogdandy, Common 
principles for a plurality of orders: A study on public authority in the European legal area, 12 
INT'L J. CONST. L. 980 (2014). 
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but merely which set of norms overrides the other: either constitutional law norms 
override international law norms or vice versa.  
Traditionally both internationalists and constitutionalists engaged in this debate 
use two types of arguments: 1) an instrumental argument under which one system 
of norms overrides the other because it is more likely to protect rights: it is more 
effective, stable, impartial, or superior in other respects.
 13
 2) A consent-based 
argument under which the normative status of the norms rests on (individual or 
state) consent.
14
 Both the instrumentalist argument and the consent-based 
argument have been subjected to harsh critiques.
15
This Article develops a new 
type of arguments for internationalism and for constitutionalism. It also 
challenges the quest for a hierarchy between constitutional law and international 
law. We believe that the quest for a hierarchy is inherently misguided. Instead, we 
argue for “the discordant parity” hypothesis, namely the equal status of 
international law and constitutional law. 
To establish the discordant parity hypothesis, the Article provides new arguments 
both for the internationalists’ convictions under which international norms ought 
to override constitutional norms (the “internationalist” view) and for 
constitutionalists’ convictions under which constitutional norms ought to override 
international norms (the “constitutionalist” view). Ultimately, we suggest that the 
                                                            
13 For internationalists who stress the instrumentalist arguments, see Louis Henkin, International 
Human Rights as "Rights", 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 425, 427–28 (1979); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & 
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 
AM. J. SOC. 1373, 1383 (2005) ("The human rights regime was principally constructed to identify 
and classify which rights are globally legitimate, to provide a forum for the exchange of 
information regarding violations, and to convince governments and violators that laws protecting 
human rights are appropriate constraints on the nation-state that should be respected."). For 
constitutionalists who stress instrumentalist arguments, see Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism 
and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 415 (1984).Eric Posner, International Law: A 
Welfare Approach 73 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 487, 543 (2006). See in general, ERIC POSNER, THE 
PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009), Eric Posner, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2014). 
14  For internationalists who use consent-based arguments, see S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 68 (Sept. 7); Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and 
Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 5 (1999). For 
constitutionalists who stress consent-based arguments, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The federal and State governments are in fact but different 
agents and trustees of the people”); Paul W. Kahn, Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, 
Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L. L. 1 (2000). 
15  For a general critique  of instrumentalist arguments in political theory, see Alon Harel, Why 
Law Matters 1-9 (2014). Under the argument developed there instrumentalist arguments typically 
suffer from "insincerity" or "inauthenticity;" they fail to identify (or capture) the real sentiments 
underlying the urge to sustain or design global institutions or procedures or state constitutions. 
There is a sense that instrumental considerations are not the ones that appeal to citizens or 
politicians and that, as a matter of fact, such considerations are mere rationalizations of other 
sentiments. For a critique of consent-based argument, see Mila Versteeg, Unpopular 
Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L.J. 1133, 1138 (2014). Internationalist consent-based arguments do not 
seem to cohere with the dominant view in international law under which international human 
rights are ultimately natural rights. As asserted in the Preamble to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (1996): [T]hese rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person.” For more general philosophical objections to consent-based arguments, see Ronald 
Dworkin, The Original Position, in READING RAWLS 16, 17–21 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1807-08 (2005). 
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parity hypothesis is ideally suited to ensure individual liberty. The parity between 
international and constitutional norms does not rest on harmonious 
interdependence. Parity implies friction; but friction is a positive, indeed, a 
necessary element for ensuring individual liberty. Hence the ‘discordant parity’: 
international norms and constitutional norms compete with each other and seek to 
dominate the normative sphere.  
Our justification for the discordant parity model does not rest on empirical 
conjectures concerning the effectiveness of such a system. Instead, our argument 
rests on principled concerns – concerns that are independent of any empirical 
conjectures. The justifications for both internationalism and constitutionalism 
defended in this Article give rise to what we label robust internationalism and 
robust constitutionalism. We label it 'robust' because under the proposed view, the 
value of international law norms and the value of constitutional law norms do not 
hinge (merely) on their contingent contribution to the substantive merit of the 
resulting political or legal decisions. In contrast to the prevalent view, 
international law norms as well as constitutional law norms are not mere 
contingent instruments to guarantee good, just or coherent decisions; they are 
valuable for other reasons and, consequently, their desirability does not depend 
only or primarily on the degree to which they contribute to the substantive merit 
of the resulting legislation or decisions. More specifically international law norms 
and constitutional law norms are valuable because they transform and restructure 
the relations between the state, its citizens and the global community in various 
ways. The conflict between the two positions is inevitable as it is a byproduct of 
justified claims of both systems. 
To justify the superior normative status of international norms (robust 
internationalism) we argue that the overriding power of international norms is 
necessary to publicly acknowledge that the protection of rights by the state is 
obligatory. The protection of rights is a duty of the state – including its pouvoir 
constituant – rather than contingent on its good will or discretion. The overriding 
power of international law norms provides public recognition that the protection 
of rights is the state's (and the people’s) duty rather than merely a discretionary 
gesture on its part. 
To justify the superior normative status of constitutional norms (robust 
constitutionalism) we argue that the overriding power of state constitutions is 
necessary to guarantee that citizens are not alienated from their rights. The value 
of rights hinges on the active participation of the citizen in the definition and the 
exercise of her rights. The effective exercise of rights hinges on the control that 
individuals have over the content of the rights without which rights lose their 
value.
16
 To the extent that individuals do not perceive the rights as their own 
creation, their ability to pursue these rights and exercise them is undermined. We 
support therefore the discordant parity paradigm under which the each of the two 
systems of norms claims to be superior to the other. 
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 HAREL, supra note 16 at 39. 
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To help conceptualize the discordant parity paradigm let us provide an analogy. 
The legal system typically enforces obligations on parents to take care of their 
children and promote their well-being according to authoritative determinations 
and it treats these determinations as overriding the determinations of the parents. 
The legal obligation is important not only or primarily for its contribution to the 
welfare of children. Instead, it is important also because it underscores the fact 
that promoting the well-being of children is not discretionary on the will of 
parents; it is a duty publicly recognized by the law.
17
 Yet, at the same time, it is 
also understood that parents must promote their children's well-being because they 
care about it rather than because they merely comply with a legal obligation. 
Hence, the law must also respect the rights of parents to actively participate in 
making authoritative determinations concerning the well-being of the child. 
Inevitably, there may be tensions between the state’s determinations and the 
parents' determinations of what well-being consists of and the best means to bring 
it about. Authoritative judgments of the state claim priority over the judgments of 
the parent and, at the same time, some parents defy the state's judgments on the 
grounds that their judgment is superior to that of the state and therefore it ought to 
prevail. Such defiance is sometimes tolerated by the state given the understanding 
that parents have the right to actively participate in making determinations 
concerning the well-being of their children.
18
 There is therefore a persistent 
tension between the conviction that well-being of children must be defined by the 
state in ways that are independent of the parent's discretion and the conviction that 
effective parenthood presupposes power to make such determinations and, at 
times, even subordinate the state's determinations to those of the parent.
19
 This 
tension is not only tolerated, but should be protected, to emphasize the soundness 
of both perspectives. The relations between international law norms and 
constitutional law norms are similar; international and constitutional norms co-
                                                            
17 Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children: Standards for Removal of 
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of 
Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 638 (1976). 
18 Education can provide a good example. Parents may wish to educate the child in a way that the 
state regards as detrimental to the well-being of the child. On the one hand, parents must have 
some input on the child's education; on the other hand the state ought to impose some limits. We 
don't know ex ante what the boundaries of state intervention are. At times, we respect the parent’s 
judgments even when we judge their judgments to be wrong. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972).  
19 A clear articulation of this ambivalence concerning the law can be found in Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale L. J. 293, 301 (1988). Bartlett argues:  
 
"The role of law in forming the social context within which parents might internalize high 
ideals for responsibility and voluntarily proceed to act upon them is a tricky one. 
Somehow the law must contribute to the creation of high expectations for parents, while 
leaving sufficient leeway so that parents are free to become responsible in the true sense. 
A hands-off approach by the law to questions of parenthood would abdicate any societal 
responsibility for norms of parenthood; yet a tight, comprehensive set of controls would 
remove from parents the discretion to act, upon which the capacity of moral decision 




exist and their co-existence is characterized – and must be characterized – by 
persistent conflicts and tensions. 
Part II defends robust internationalism and Part III defends robust 
constitutionalism. Part IV defends the discordant parity model and draws the 
implications of this view. Part V concludes. 
 
 
II. WHY INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS MUST ENJOY PRIMACY? IN 
DEFENSE OF ROBUST INTERNATIONALISM 
The Talmud tells a story of a Gentile who missed a great business opportunity 
because he did not want to disturb his father by taking a key that was under his 
father’s pillow. The red cow that was his reward for honoring his parents was of 
immense value at the time. Rabbi Ulla inferred from this story the lesson that if a 
Gentile, who is not commanded by God to honor his parents, was rewarded so 
profoundly, a Jew, who is subject to the commandment to honor his parents, 
would be rewarded even more for so doing. Rabbi Ulla based this conclusion on a 
statement by Rabbi Hanina that “he who is commanded and fulfills [the 
command] is greater than he who fulfills it though not commanded.”20  
This Part applies this lesson to the state, and argues that a state which honors 
rights but is not “commanded to do so,” i.e., is not internationally bound to do so, 
is inferior to a state in which the constituent assembly “is commanded to do so,” 
i.e., bound by global duties protecting individual rights (and complies with them). 
The latter society is superior for the reason that in such a society individuals do 
not live “at the mercy” of the collective; their rights do not depend on the state's 
judgments (concerning the public good) or on its inclinations. 
 
A. Why States Should be Bound by Internationally Recognized Human 
Rights  
 
This Part develops the observation illustrated by the red cow story; it argues that 
the value of internationally-based human rights is not grounded merely in their 
effectiveness or instrumental value. Instead, they serve an important function in 
publicly conveying the fact that human rights are not discretionary; that they are a 
matter of global concern to be observed by the state as a matter of duty rather than 
choice, preference or judgment. This is the real case for robust internationalism. It 
is robust in the sense that this justification does not hinge on empirical 
considerations such as the effectiveness of international human rights or the 
question of whether the states agreed to be bound by these rights.   
                                                            
20 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, tract Kiddushin at 31a. 
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Individuals have political rights and the normative force of these rights is (at least 
sometimes) independent of the global order. The state has a duty to protect 
freedoms and guarantee equality independently of whether these are globally 
entrenched. One can envision two ways to protect these rights. Under the first, the 
protection of rights is done exclusively by the state. Under the second, there is an 
international order of norms which entrenches these rights. Theoretically, at least 
it is possible that the protection of rights under both systems will be equally 
effective. The question we address here is which system is better? Is it valuable to 
internationally entrench pre-existing moral or political rights even when such an 
entrenchment is not conducive to the protection of rights? Do international rights 
as such matter, and if so, why? 
This Part addresses that question and maintains that rights grounded in 
international law matter, as the international entrenchment of pre-existing 
moral/political rights is valuable (independently of whether such a recognition is 
conducive to the protection of these rights). The value of international 
entrenchment is grounded in the fact that such an entrenchment is itself a form of 
public recognition that the protection of rights is the state's duty rather than 
merely a discretionary gesture on its part, or that it is contingent upon the state's 
own judgments concerning the public good. The international entrenchment of 
rights is essential to the protection of freedom. Citizens are freer in a society in 
which rights are recognized as duties rather than as grounded in the mere 
judgments or inclinations of the founders of the constitution or its interpreters.  
To justify internationalism examine the difference between a world in which the 
state constitution protects rights but given the absence of any internationally 
recognized rights there are no publicly recognized limitations on the power of the 
state. The decision to protect rights and entrench them in the constitution does not 
depend upon the state's internationally recognized duties; instead, it is understood 
to be contingent upon the constitution or the inclinations of the founders or 
interpreters of the constitution. The citizens of such a state are 'at the mercy' of the 
inclinations of the founders or interpreters of the constitution. In contrast, if the 
state is bound by international norms the state is publicly bound by such norms 
and consequently citizens' right do not depend upon such inclinations.  
The rationale underlying internationalism is grounded in the significance of the 
public recognition of rights-based duties binding the state. In particular, the 
rationale is grounded in the publicly salient differentiation between discretionary 
decisions of the state (namely those decisions that are grounded in the state's 
inclinations/preferences/judgments/tastes) and those decisions that are grounded 
in international rights-based duties. While in both cases fundamental freedoms are 
protected to the same extent, it is only in the latter case that they are honored, i.e., 
protected as rights which bind the state rather than as discretionary measures the 
protection of which is at the mercy of the state.   
The claim we defend has two distinctive components. The first concerns cases in 
which the state complies with the internationally-recognized rights. It is obviously 
good when our rights are being protected by the state, but it is even better if it is 
acknowledged that the protection is not a byproduct of discretion or judgment on 
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the part of the state. The international norms highlight the fact that the protection 
of rights is not discretionary; it is mandatory and a state which protects them does 
not do it because it wishes to do so; it merely complies with what it ought to do. 
The second component concerns cases of violation of rights. It is of course bad if 
our rights are being violated by the state, but it is even worse if the state violates 
them without the violation being labelled as a violation and condemned as 
wrongful. The international community serves as a body that recognizes the 
wrongfulness of the violation and, consequently, raises its voice and pronounces 
condemnation. Such a voice may of course serve to deter (or prevent) future 
violations or help to bring about a remedy. But this is not the only purpose of 
global proclamations. In addition, global proclamations constitute public 
acknowledgment and recognition that the state committed a wrong, 
To sum up we defend here two observations: 1) It is good when rights are 
respected but it is even better when rights are respected not merely out of the good 
will or the judgment of the state but out of public understanding that it is its duty 
to respect these rights; 2) It is bad when rights are violated but even worse when 
the violation is not publicly recognized as such. Some skeptical voices may 
question the normative relevance of this observation. In particular, one may ask 
why one should care about such differentiation between issues that are subject to 
the discretion of the state and those that are not. Arguably, what we care about is 
the effective protection of rights and not whether such a protection is recognized 
as a duty or who recognizes it as a duty. Hence, international human rights are 
mere instruments and the view that attributes to them value independently of their 
effects on the compliance of the states is nothing but internationalist fetishism.  
The answer to this challenge rests on the concern for freedom, in particular the 
concern for republican freedom. Republican freedom requires not only that other 
people do not restrict our freedoms but also that no other people have the power to 
restrict our freedoms.
21
 Consequently, citizens are freer in a society in which 
human rights are recognized as duties binding the state rather than as resulting 
from the mere judgments, preferences or inclinations of legislatures or polities. In 
states in which human rights are recognized as duties imposed on the state, 
citizens do not live at the mercy of their legislature or, at the mercy of the drafters 
or interpreters of the national constitution. Their rights are not contingent on the 
good will or the inclination of the state; they are protected by the state because of 
the institutionally-entrenched international recognition that it is obliged to protect 
them and not merely because the state prefers to protect them or because it judges 
that protecting them promotes the public good. 
To establish this claim consider first the following analogy: A needs $100 to 
cover some urgent costs. Fortunately, B owes A $100 and A turns to B to get his 
money back. B denies that he owes A the money, but, as a gesture of friendship, is 
willing to grant A $100 “as a present,” as B professes to understand that A faces 
economic hardship.  
                                                            
21
 PHILLIP PETTIT, REBULICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 5 (1999). 
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A is justifiably resentful and possibly even furious. A cares not merely that the 
$100 be given to him to cover his urgent costs, but also that it be given to him as a 
repayment of a debt rather than as a present. A wants B to repay his debt, rather 
than merely to receive money. But why should A care? Why should it matter to 
him whether B gives him a present or repays his debt? B's reluctance to concede 
his debt harms A, as it implies that A is “at the mercy of” B’s good will, i.e., that 
it is up to B to decide whether or not to give A the money.  
Even if B insists on giving the money as a present, A may find some consolation 
in the willingness of the community to support his demand, impose sanctions on B 
and punish B for his reluctance to acknowledge his debt. Thus, A may not merely 
justifiably insist that B concede the debt but also insists that if B fails to repay his 
debt to A (and insists on giving A “a present”), then the community at large, 
reproaches B. As long as such a public condemnation is as a general rule intense 
and effective, then it would be appropriate to say that A is not “at the mercy of 
B.”  
Closer to our concerns here is the example of slavery. Slavery could presumably 
be eradicated without entrenching an international prohibition on slavery. Instead 
of entrenching such an international prohibition, citizens could entrench such 
prohibitions in their own constitutions. Yet, the international prohibition serves to 
highlight the fact that the abolition of slavery is not discretionary on the will of 
the state; it does not depend on its good will. The entrenchment of international 
law prohibition on slavery may have had some instrumental value in eliminating 
slavery. But the instrumental contribution to the elimination of slavery is not the 
only concern underlying the international entrenchment of the prohibition against 
slavery. 
There are two important claims that are illustrated by considering the example of 
debt. First, in order not to be “at the mercy of” B it is not sufficient that there are 
moral norms requiring B to honor rights. There also must be effective social 
norms, practices, conventions and understandings requiring B to do so. It is the 
public understanding that counts not merely the binding force of moral norms. In 
the absence of such a public understanding, it can be plausibly said that the debt is 
“up to B” in the sense that the repayment of the debt hinges on B's judgments or 
inclinations to repay. In our case the social norms that can bind the state are 
international norms; they are the ones that claim priority over the state 
constitution and thereby underscore the fact that the protection of rights is not a 
discretionary measure on the part of the state and does not rest upon its 
judgments. 
Second, in order “not to be at the mercy of B” it is not required that B would 
indeed be forced to acknowledge his debt. Precisely as I am not “at the mercy” of 
criminals if I live in a state that effectively enforces the law (even in case a crime 
is committed against me), so A is not at the mercy of B simply because B refuses 
to acknowledge his debt so long as there is a general system of sanctions or at 
least stigma attached to people who refuse to acknowledge their debts. A failure 
of the system to enforce the debt of B in a particular case does not imply that it is 
“up to B” to pay or not to pay his debt or that A is “at his mercy.” Further, for 
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certain purposes, even if I am very vulnerable to outside interference, there is a 
fundamental difference between different types of vulnerability. As Louis Phillipe 
Hodgson noted: “If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out 
that, when all relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to 
outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that 
our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom.”22 
International norms that require the state to honor its rights-based duties are 
equivalent to the social norms that require B to pay his debt or to the legal norms 
that bar slavery. Such norms serve the purpose of publicly labelling violations of 
human rights as wrongs. In the absence of international norms, individuals live at 
the mercy of the provisions of their own national constitutions. If the state violates 
individual rights, no authoritative body superior to the state can proclaim that 
wrongs were committed. While other states can condemn the violations, they 
cannot claim that their judgments are superior to those of the state. If rights are 
honored, it is unclear whether honoring them is merely discretionary or obligatory 
on the part of the state.  
Anecdotal indications for the conviction  that internationalism does not rest 
merely on its effectiveness can be found in some of the statements made by the 
founders of the global order. One of the first architects of the international 
protection of human rights, André Mandelstam, who drafted the 1929 Resolution 
of the Institute of International Law on international human rights, was the first to 
articulate this idea. He stated:  
“I am convinced that, without resorting to the political arena, the Institute's 
duty is to raise its voice loudly and to proclaim without delay the great 
new principle […]: human rights exist, and it is the duty of each state to 
respect them.”23 
It is therefore the loud voice and the proclamation without delay that seem 
important to Mandelstam. The global voice is a voice that announces that “it is the 
duty of each state” to respect human rights. This conviction is reflected in the 
1929 Resolution that emphasizes several times the “duty” of every state to 




The significance of proclamation of this type was also emphasized by Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the mastermind of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
who stressed the importance of the declarative act of an otherwise non-legally 
binding document:  
                                                            
22 Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Kant on the Right to Freedom: A Defense, 120 ETHICS 791, 816 
(2010). 
23 André Mandelstam, Inst. of Int'l Law (Oct. 8, 1921), quoted in BRUNO CABANES, THE GREAT 
WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIANISM, 1918–1924, at 313 (2014); See also Helmut Philipp 
Aust, From Diplomat to Academic Activist: André Mandelstam and the History of Human Rights, 
25 EUR. J. INT'L L.1105 (2014).  
24 See, e.g, supra note 2, Art. 1.: “Il est du devoir de tout Etat de reconnaître à tout individu le droit 
égal à la vie, à la liberté, … ” (“It is the duty of every State to recognize to everyone the equal 
right to life, liberty…” (our emphasis). 
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It is a declaration of basic principles of human rights and freedoms, to be 
stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by formal vote of its 
members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples of all nations. ....
25
 
These sources suggest that internationalism is designed to underscore the fact that 
the protection of human rights is a matter of duty rather than discretion or good 
will. The international order consisting of binding global directives facilitates a 
clear differentiation between duty-based decisions and discretionary decisions 
which depend on the good will of the state. Internationalism highlights the fact 
that the former category of duty-based decisions must be publicly acknowledged 
and differentiated from the second. Let us turn to examine some objections to this 
analysis.  
 
B. At the Mercy of Persons after All? Response to Criticism  
 
Against this argument one could raise the following objection: neither 
international norms nor constitutional norms can protect our freedom as all of 
these norms are a human creation and, consequently, we all are subject to the 
mercy of others. Somebody after all has to draft international norms and 
somebody has to interpret them. It follows that even if binding international 
norms are entrenched citizens still live at the mercy of the drafters of the global 
norms or their interpreters. In the absence of a constitution, citizens in a 
democracy live at the mercy of their legislatures. The entrenchment of 
constitutional rights that overrides legislative decisions protects them from this 
predicament but, instead, it subjects citizens to the mercy of the drafters (or 
interpreters) of the constitution. Similarly, international human rights norms may 
protect individuals from the whims of the interpreters or the drafters of the 
constitution but it subjects individuals to the preferences, judgments and whims of 
those who draft or interpret the international norms. There is therefore no way we 
can overcome the subjugation to some set of norms that ultimately are  drafted 
and interpreted by human beings and depend therefore on their discretion or on 
their preferences.  
It is easy to see that this argument implies that freedom in the sense that we use 
here can never be realized. Whatever constraints designed to protect individual 
rights are imposed, it is always the case that there is some entity which imposed it 
(or which can amend or interpret it).  
                                                            
25 Eleanor Roosevelt, U.S. Delegate, U.N. Gen. Assembly, On the Adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 9, 1948). Interestingly the approach taken by the drafters of 
the 1948 Declaration is radically different. Instead of emphasizing states' duties, as the 1929 
resolution did, the Universal Declaration refers to “the rights” of “everyone,” The rationale 
provided to these rights is consent. (“whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, 




This challenge is important and misguided at the same time.
26
 It is important 
because (as we show below) it can serve in explaining the limitations of national 
constitutions or even of international norms. It is true therefore that in some sense 
we are always at the mercy of some entity or other. At the same time, it is 
misguided because it proves too much. It is one thing to be a slave whose 
benevolent master does not use his power to issue commands and quite another 
thing to live in a jurisdiction which prohibits slavery, or in a jurisdiction which 
entrenches a constitutional prohibition against slavery. Admittedly, in all cases we 
are subject to the power of some entity (the master in the first case the legislature 
in the second case and the founders of the constitution in the last case). But, it is 
essential to know who that entity is, what it represents and what it means to be 
subjected to its powers. The slave owner may be benevolent and never use his 
powers but to be at his mercy is demeaning nevertheless. In contrast, to be subject 
to the power of the interpreter of the international or the constitutional norm is 
fundamentally different and it does not bear on our status in the same way.  
This observation raises the question of identifying the difference between these 
two conditions. When can we justifiably raise the grievance that we are un-free 
not because our rights are violated but because our rights hinge on the good will 
or intentions of others and when being dependent on the will of others is 
detrimental to our freedom. 
Judgments of this type are contextual; they require an understanding of traditions 
practices and institutions. To be at the mercy of an interpreter of the international 
or the constitutional norm is often perceived to be better than to be at the mercy of 
a legislature. This is not (only) because courts are more likely to protect such 
rights than legislatures. More importantly, the interpreter has a text to interpret, 
and any interpretation requires her to give account for her choice, whereas the 
voter has only to cast her preference, unabashedly promoting her interest. The 
same relation which exists between legislatures and state constitutions is 
replicated in the relations between the international community and the 
constitutions.  
We can sum up the discussion by using perhaps an observation which has been 
made in a different context by Thomas Nagel: “To be tortured would be terrible; 
but to be tortured and also to be someone it was not wrong to torture would be 
even worse.”27 Robust internationalism rests on the conviction that there is one 
thing that is even worse than violation of rights – violation which is not 
accompanied by an authoritative proclamation that such a violation is wrong. It is 
not enough that states protect human rights; in addition, their violation ought to be 
recognized publicly as a wrong. Human rights internationalism is not merely an 
instrument to protect rights; the desirability of human rights internationalism does 
not hinge only on the question of whether it is effective in protecting rights or in 
minimizing the frequency and severity of human rights violations. The overriding 
power of international norms provides a clear indication for the binding nature of 
rights. The protection of rights is not a prerogative of the state which it may 
                                                            
26 See HAREL, supra note 16, at 185. 
27 Thomas Nagel, Personal Rights and Public Space, 24 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 93 (1995). 
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comply with or not. It is a duty of the state and the international norms provide an 
institutional recognition of this fact.  
Naturally, this argument is not conclusive. Perhaps there are strong instrumental 
reasons which override the concerns raised above. Perhaps, for instance, state 
constitutions are more effective in protecting rights and the overriding powers of 
international norms undermine their effectiveness. Indeed, in the next section we 
show that there are principled reasons to grant overriding normative powers to 
constitutional norms. 
 
III. WHY CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS MUST ENJOY PRIMACY? IN 
DEFENSE OF ROBUST CONSTITUTIONALISM  
The last Part provided arguments favoring the supremacy of international law. 
Yet, as we show in this Part there are also compelling arguments favoring the 
supremacy of constitutional law (or more broadly of state law).  
There are two traditional ways to justify the overriding powers of constitutional 
norms over international norms. Under the first, constitutions are necessary as the 
protection of rights ought to be informed by local concerns and circumstances. 
State constitutions may therefore entrench rights in ways that are more conducive 
to the effective protection of rights given the local concerns and traditions.
28
 
Under the second, state constitutions are the embodiment of the will of the people 
and the will of the people or their consent are necessary for legitimacy. 
Democratic or contractarian concerns therefore require us to subject ourselves to 
the authority of state constitutions.
29
 Hence democratic concerns dictate that state 
constitutional provisions have overriding powers over global norms. 
This Part defends a different justification. It argues that the constitutionalism is 
necessary for the value of rights to be realized. The constitutional protection of 
rights is not simply a matter of local concerns, popular consent or general 
agreement. Instead, the value of rights hinges on who makes authoritative 
determinations about them. The very same right-protecting norm may have a 
different value depending on its origins. More specifically, making authoritative 
judgments by the state induces its citizens to define the boundaries of human 
rights and their weight. This task in turn is conducive (or even necessary) to the 
exercise of these rights by citizens. Granting international norms overriding 
normative status distances citizens from these rights and, consequently, 
undermines the willingness and readiness to exercise them. 
 
A. The Value of Exercising Rights  
                                                            
28 See, e.g., James W. Nickel, Cultural Diversity and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 43 (Jack L. Nelson & Vera M. Green eds., 1980); Bonny 
Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of Human Rights 
in the African State, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 838, 844 (2000). 




Why do rights need to be our creation? What makes it important that we 
determine what our rights are? The answer lies in an important feature of rights, 
namely in the fact that (many) rights become valuable when individuals exercise 
their rights. The value of autonomy-enhancing rights remains unfulfilled if 
individuals do not exercise their autonomy-enhancing rights. This is part of a 
theme characterizing values more generally. Values, as Joseph Raz maintains, 
“depend on valuers for their realisation, for the value of objects with value is 
fulfilled only through being appreciated.”30 Raz continues and argues as follows: 
 
That the value of objects remains unfulfilled, if not valued, is explained 
and further supported by a familiar fact. That an object has value can have 
an impact on how things are in the world only through being recognized. 
The normal and appropriate way in which the value of things influences 
matters in the world is by being appreciated—that is respected and 




Given that rights are grounded in values, the engagement of rights holders is 
necessary for the realization of the value of rights. Thus, for instance, autonomy 
makes people' lives better if, and to the extent that, they exercise it in their lives 
and perceive the exercise of autonomy to be valuable. Yet there are pre-conditions 
for the successful exercise of rights. The most important precondition is our 
ability to perceive ourselves as participating in the creation of the rights. Themore 




Admittedly, this observation cannot be proven either conceptually or empirically. 
To substantiate it we may compare the situation of a person who gets her rights by 
decree from a dictator and a person who gets her rights within an active 
democratic participatory polity which determines the boundaries of these rights. It 
seems inevitable that the former is more likely to be alienated from her rights 
while the latter is more likely to endorse the rights and exercise them.  Note that 
unlike the traditional view we do not hold democratic participation to be valuable 
in itself. Instead, we perceive it as a precondition (or at least as a factor which 
reinforces) the disposition to exercise rights effectively.   
 
To illustrate let us use the example mentioned in the introduction: determinations 
concerning the welfare of a child. Identifying what is conducive to the welfare of 
a child can be done by various agents. But it is particularly desirable that it be 
done by the parent who is in charge of promoting the welfare of the child. Even 
flawed judgments made by the parent have value as they contribute to the forging 
of a strong relationship between the parent and the child. Granting powers to the 
                                                            
30 Joseph Raz, The Practice of Value, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 124 (2001). 
31 Raz, The Practice of Value, supra note 74 at 28.  
32 Robert Post and Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 
HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES LAW REVIEW 373, 374 (2007) (“The premise of 
democratic constitutionalism is that the authority of the Constitution depends on its democratic 
legitimacy, upon the Constitution’s ability to inspire Americans to recognize it as their 
Constitution.”) (emphasis in original). 
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parent to make such determinations (even when her judgments are inferior to 
those of the state) may therefore be desirable. Similarly we believe granting states 
overriding powers to make determinations concerning the scope of rights and their 
weight is valuable not because states are better than the international community 
in making these determinations but because the very collective participation in  
making these determinations by citizens is valuable.  
Further as Benvenisti and Lustig pointed out in a different context, the 
participation of citizens in making basic judgments concerning rights “facilitates 
informed decisions, whose importance to the individual goes way beyond 
instrumental considerations. Through participation one develops a sense of 
empathy to one’s fellow-citizens and becomes consciously a member of one’s 
community.
33
 As John Stuart Mill argued : "[I]t is from political discussion and 
collective political action that one whose daily occupations concentrate his 
interests in a small circle round himself, learns to feel for and with his fellow-
citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community.
34
 One of the 
negative byproducts of internationalism is the resulting alienation of the polity 
from the culture of rights; in other words, relegating citizens to be norm-takers.  
Rights must be embodied in the practices of executive bodies, in the modes of 
operation of state institutions and also be entrenched in foundational documents of 
the state. This makes rights “ours” in a way that contrasts with the way rights 
operate in a world in which states “comply” or “defer” to the dictates of 
international norms. 
 
Constitutionalism or, more generally norms originated in the state (rather than the 
international community) are (under normal circumstances) the creation of 
citizens of the state. Irrespective of what the content of the norms is, such a 
process  facilitates the genuine attribution of these norms to the citizens. The 
citizens can therefore pride themselves as being the creators of these norms. here 
is a strong intimate relation between us being the creators of the norms that 
entrench our rights and us being willing and able to exercise these rights. Given 
that the exercise of rights is what ultimately gives rights value, it follows that 
constitutionalism is a precondition for realizing the value of rights.    
 
 
To support this intuition assume a world which is governed exclusively by 
international law norms. In this world states are bound by international norms 
protecting human rights. Further in our imaginary world states comply with 
international norms but they do it merely because of their international duties. 
They perceive the international norms protecting rights as side constraints 
imposed on them by the international community.  
 
                                                            
33 Doreen Lustig & Eyal Benvenisti, The Multinational Corporation as 'The Good Despot': The 
Democratic Costs of Privatization in Global Settings, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 125, 136 
(2014). 
34
 JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, 83 (HENRY 
REGNERY CO. 1962) (1861). 
17 
 
Kelsen had a useful analogy. We can analogize states in a global polity to 
companies in a state.
35
 Companies are expected to abide by the law including the 
law protecting the rights of workers and consumers. But they are not expected to 
be active participants in determining what these rights are. They have to accept 
the authoritative judgments made by the state (and, perhaps, by the international 
community). One could think of states as companies namely as passive recipients 
of the judgments of the international community rather than as active participants 
in determining what rights we have. A state which defers to the international 
norms and makes no judgments of its own as to the justifiability of these norms is 
unlikely to create an environment in which citizens exercise their rights. Precisely 
as a parent who aims at promoting the well-being of a child without participating 
actively in determining what the well-being of the child consists of would 
typically fail in doing so, so the state which merely defers to or complies with the 
international norms would fail in promoting rights. The granting of overriding 
normative status to international norms weakens the involvement of the state in 
delineating the scope of rights. This, in turn would alienate citizens and weaken 
their willingness and ability to exercise rights. 
 
Arguably, however constitutions are as detached and alienated as international 
law is. After all constitutions are designed to limit and constrain the popular will. 
Hence, it is paradoxical to say that by giving priority to constitutional norms, one 
gives a voice to the people. 
 
We do not deny that relative to legislation constitutional provisions may be 
alienating. If the contrast is between constitutions and legislation it is evident that 
legislation is less detached than constitutions and that individuals have greater 
control over it. Yet typically when the contrast is between constitutional law and 
international law, constitutional law is less detached and less alienating from 
international law as state constitutions are still a product of the polities. We turn in 
the next section to examine the normative implications of this view and defend the 
discordant parity hypothesis.  
 
 
IV.  THE CASE FOR DISCORDANT PARITY   
Part II and Part III give rise to a dilemma. On the one hand Part II argues for 
robust internationalism, namely it argues that international human rights should 
override constitutional norms as their superior normative power provides an 
institutional embodiment of the fact that rights are not merely discretionary; they 
are duties imposed on the state. On the other hand, Part III argues for robust 
constitutionalism, namely it argues that constitutional rights ought to override 
international provisions. The active participation of the state in determining the 
boundaries of rights and their weight is essential for the effective protection of 
rights by the polity as it facilitates engagement with rights and reinforces the 
willingness and readiness of citizens to exercise their rights. Consequently, the 
role of law in this context is a tricky one; it must, on the one hand, embody the 
                                                            
35 Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, 66 ETHICS 1, 34 (1955). 
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understanding that the protection of rights is a matter of duty on the part of the 
state and, on the other hand, it must prompt citizens to exercise their rights. 
Somehow, the law must square the circle; it must contribute to the creation of 
high expectations for states, while leaving sufficient leeway so that states are free 
to become responsible in the true sense. A hands-off approach by the international 
community to questions of rights would erode the recognition that protecting 
rights is a duty of the state. Yet a tight, comprehensive set of global controls 
would remove from the states the discretion to make decisions and, consequently 
would weaken the capacity and willingness of citizens to exercise these rights. 
 
One solution is of course to decide which concern is weightier. If the case for 
internationalism is weightier it follows that international norms ought to override 
state norms. If, on the other hand the case for constitutionalism is stronger, 
international norms ought to be overridden by state norms. In this Part we develop 
a different proposal and defend the model of discordant parity, namely a system 
under which international and constitutional norms have equal status. The parity 
we advocate is not based on harmony and cooperation between international or 
constitutional norms but on constant tensions frictions and conflicts. Before 
defending it, let us first establish that legal practice often presupposes hierarchy. 
Section B establishes that both state and international courts presuppose hierarchy 
and reject parity. As we argued in the introduction, the disagreement is not 
whether hierarchy is desirable but which hierarchy ought to guide courts. Section 
C defends discordant parity and examines its practical implications. 
 
A. Conflicting Assumptions of Hierarchy as Practiced by Courts  
 
The view that there is a strict hierarchy between international and state norms can 
be found in legal decisions made by both state and international courts. 
Unsurprisingly state courts believe that state constitutions are superior to 
international norms while international tribunals defend the opposite view. Let us 
illustrate. 
State courts in Europe refuse to give up on the national protection of their 
citizens’ human rights as dictated by their own constitutions. For this reason, the 
unanimous conclusion of state courts is that in cases of direct conflict between 
international and state norms, the state norms prevail.
36
 
A clear instance is the so-called Brunner case where the German Constitutional 
Court asserted that its role is to guarantee “this essential content [of the basic 
rights] as against the sovereign powers of the [European] Community as well,” 
although it tried to mitigate the conflict by emphasizing that the German Court 
“exercises its jurisdiction on the applicability of secondary community legislation 
                                                            
36 See Anne Peters, Supremacy Lost: International Law Meets Domestic Constitutional Law, 3 
VIENNA ONLINE J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 170, 187 (2009); Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: 




in Germany in a relationship of co-operation with the European Court.”37 Later on 
in the Lisbon case the German Court reiterated its commitment to the view that 
when powers are transferred to international organizations such powers:  
[A]re granted under the condition that the sovereign statehood of a 
constitutional state is maintained on the basis of an integration programme 
according to the principle of conferral and respecting the Member States' 
constitutional identity, and that at the same time the Member States do not 





Accordingly, the conclusion of the German Court in the Lisbon cases was that the 
legal order of the EU is a “derived fundamental order,” whose “autonomy can 
only be understood as an autonomy to rule which is not independent but . . . is 
granted by other legal entities.” By contrast, the sovereignty of the state “requires 
independence from an external will,” And, therefore sovereignty should be 
described as “freedom that is organised by international law and committed to 
it.”39 The Czech Constitutional Court followed a similar route and argued that “for 
a nation-state just as for an individual within a society, practical freedom means 
being an actor, not an object.”40 These statements concerning the powers of state 
court are not grounded in technical considerations such as jurisdiction. Rather, the 
courts openly assert their responsibility as state organs who are guardians of their 
state constitution, the protectors of constitutional rights as against the potential 




A blatant statement to this effect was given by the Italian Constitutional Court. In 
justifying the primacy of state norms over international norms, the Italian Court 
argued that the transfer of powers to the international community is unauthorized 
when they result in: 
"[S]uppression or restriction of the fundamental rights granted to them 
[Italian citizens] by the Constitution, for these are guarantees that pertain 
                                                            
37 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 1993, 1 C.M.L.R. 
57 (1994) (Ger.). 
38 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] June 30, 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 
(¶ 226). 
39 Id. at ¶ 223. 
40 Ústavnísoud Českérepubliky 26.11.2008 (ÚS) [Constitutional Court], 19/08, ¶ 107 (Quoting 
DAVID P. CALLEO, RETHINKING EUROPE’S FUTURE 141 (2001)); See in general Wojciech 
Sadurski, "Solange, chapter 3": Constitutional Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European 
Union, 14 EUR. L. J. 1 (2008). 
41 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 29, 1974, 2 C.M.L.R. 
540 (1974) (The Solange I decision). Solange (‘as long as’) stands for the assertion by European 
constitutional courts resisting a surrender their authority to the European Court of Justice, and 
insisting on their role as guardians of their national constitutions.  See also Joined Cases C-402/05 





to disposed of, and most importantly cannot be left at the mercy of 




The Italian Court reiterated this position in another recent judgment, declaring as 
unconstitutional a law that would have barred the right of Italian citizens to sue 
Germany in Italian courts for crimes it committed during World War II.
43
 The 
Court acknowledged that under international law, the individual “right to judicial 
protection of fundamental rights” is subject to the claim of foreign states to 
immunity. Nevertheless, the tension between these two conflicting interests must 
be resolved differently under the Italian constitution since: 
in an institutional context characterized by the centrality of human 
rights,…the denial of judicial protection of fundamental rights of the 
victims of the crimes at issue (now dating back in time), determines the 
completely disproportionate sacrifice of two supreme principles of the 
Constitution. They are indeed sacrificed in order to pursue the goal of not 
interfering with the exercise of the governmental powers of the State even 
when, as in the present case, state actions can be considered war crimes… 
Consequently, insofar as the [international] law of immunity from 
jurisdiction of States conflicts with the aforementioned fundamental 
principles [of the Constitution], it has not entered the Italian legal order 
and, therefore, does not have any effect therein.
44
 
A similar view has also been endorsed in the US. Michael Paulson is a clear 
proponent of the supremacy of the US. Constitution:  
For the United States the Constitution is supreme over international law. 
International law, to the extent that it issues determinate commands or 
obligations in conflict with the US constitution is unconstitutional.
45
  
Even US theorists who are sympathetic to international law and express the hope 
that one day it may override provisions of the US Constitution admit that as a 
matter of positive law US constitutional law overrides any conflicting 
international provisions. Thus, Peter Spiro advocates granting greater significance 
to international law but acknowledges that his proposal does not reflect the 
prevailing view. Spiro argues: 
Constitutional rights have presented a discursive bulwark against the 
encroachment of international law. The continuing refusal to contemplate 
the international determination of rights betrays the embedded nationalist 
orientation of constitutional theory…These nationalist assumptions may 
be conceptually vulnerable in the face of the changing architecture of 
                                                            
42 Guglielmo Verdirame, A Normative Theory of Sovereignty Transfers, 49 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371, 
377–78 (2013) (Quoting Corte Cost. [Constitutional Court], 16 Dec., 1965, n. 98). 
43 Corte. Cost., 22 October 2014, n. 238 (It.), unofficial translation available at  
http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf 
(regarding the constitutionality of Article 1 of Law No. 848). 
44 Id., at p. 15. 
45 Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law 118 Yale L.J. 
1762, 1765 (2009).  
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international law and community…Accompanying doctrines of 
constitutional hegemony, deviations notwithstanding, were justified in a 
world in which law offered no protection of individual rights. As the 
regime of international human rights grows thick however that 




It is hardly surprising that international tribunals reject the primacy of state courts 
and believe in the primacy of international norms. The International Court of 
Justice had little trouble rejecting the position of the Italian courts “in denying 
Germany the immunity to which the Court has held it was entitled under 
customary international law [as] a breach of the obligations owed by the Italian 
State to Germany.”47 Similarly, the European Court of Justice believes in “the 
idea of absolute supremacy according to which Community law trumps even the 
core of member states' constitution.”48 Numerous cases insist on the superiority of 
European community law over the provisions of state constitutional law.
49
 The 
position of the regional human rights courts (European and Inter-American) is 
equally unambiguous.
50
 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) asserted its exclusive role in prosecuting war crimes while 
preempting state courts due to the fact that major violations of human rights that 
amount to crimes against humanity are “universal in nature … and transcending 
the interest of any one State. [I]n such circumstances, the sovereign rights of 
States cannot and should not take precedence over the right of the international 
community to act appropriately as they affect the whole of mankind and shock the 
conscience of all nations of the world.”51In concluding her detailed survey of this 
conflict from the perspective of international law, Dinah Shelton wrote what 
seems to be a prevailing view among international lawyers. Shelton wrote: 
 
The extent to which the system has moved and may still move, towards the 
imposition of global public policy on nonconsenting states remains highly 
debated, but the need for limits on states' freedom of action seems to be 
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increasingly recognized. …Perhaps the most significant positive aspect of 
this trend towards normative hierarchy is its reaffirmation of the link 
between law and ethics, in which law is one means to achieve the 
fundamental values of an international society.
52
 (references omitted) 
 
Given the persistence of the conflicts between international and constitutional 
law there have been many proposals to mitigate the tensions between the two 
systems and reduce the dissonance between constitutional rights and 
international human rights by mutual accommodation of the two systems.
53
 
Some theorists have defended a parity paradigm which is based on harmonious 
interdependence between international and constitutional law.
54
 This sentiment 
led courts to develop a variety of mechanisms designed to reduce the conflicts 
between constitutional rights and international human rights. Some of these 
methods involve accommodations by the international human rights to national 
constitutional rights; others involve accommodation by a national legal system 
to the international legal system.  
The first type of mechanisms designed to reduce the conflict consist of 
international law doctrines which aim to accommodate the demands of 
constitutional rights. Such mechanisms include for instance interpretative 
methods that are used by international tribunals that take into account the 
prevailing doctrines of national constitutions.
55
 Saving clauses which protect 
explicitly the prevailing power of certain provisions in national constitutions are 
also used extensively.
56
 Another well-settled doctrine of European law is the 
doctrine of “margin of appreciation” developed by the European Court for 
Human Rights to mediate between the demands of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the domestic norms of the member states. According to the 
Court, “the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in 
determining the steps to be taken to ensure compliance with the Convention with 
due regard to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals.”57  
The second type of mechanisms of mechanisms designed to reduce the conflict 
consist of constitutional law doctrines which aim to accommodate the demands of 
international human rights.  Some constitutions include provisions which give 
                                                            
52 Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law 100 American Journal of International 
Law 291, 323 (2006).  
53 Gerald L. Neumann, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance 55 
Stanford L. Rev. 1863 (2003); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A 
Constitutional Frame of Analysis 15 European Journal of International law 907 (2004).  
54 For example Mattias Kumm argued: “The relationship between domestic and international law 
is neither one of derivation nor of autonomy, but of mutual dependence. National and international 
law are mutually co-constitutive. The constitutional legitimacy of national law depends, in part, on 
being adequately integrated into an appropriately structured international legal system. And the  
legitimacy of the international legal system depends, in part, on states having an adequate 
constitutional structure. The standards of constitutional legitimacy are to be derived from an 
integrative conception of public law that spans the national-international divide.” See Mattias 
Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 612 (2013). 
55 See Neumann, supra note 100 at 1895-99.  
56 Neumann, supra note 100 at 1886-87. 
57 Lautsi  v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.. 
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constitutional status to human rights treaties.
58
 Other national constitutions guide 
judges to interpret the constitution in ways that do not conflict with international 
human rights law.
59
 Even in the American context which, as a general rule is quite 
hostile to international influences, some theorists expressed the conviction that 
"international law is our law" and showed that the American courts gave greater 
role to international law than is generally perceived. This was done by using 
various means including for instance by endorsing international standards in 
interpreting provisions of the US Constitution.
60
Most scholars regard this head-on 
clash between constitutional and international law with concern. Many are critical 
and seek to offer theses why national courts are right and international courts are 
wrong, or vice versa.
61
 We are less concerned. We actually regard this tension as 
useful for emphasizing the primacy of human rights and for bolstering freedom. 
The next section rejects the assumption of hierarchy and defends the parity 
paradigm. 
 
B. The Case for Discordant Parity  
 
This section argues that both international and state courts have it right and 
wrong.
62
The discordant parity paradigm rejects both internationalism (advocated 
by international tribunals) and constitutionalism (advocated by state courts). 
Under the discordant parity paradigm, a system that seeks to respect and ensure 
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human rights must not be based on a rigid hierarchy but instead on two distinct 
foundations, one derived from a global concern for individual rights aimed at 
conveying publicly the mandatory non-discretionary force of human rights and the 
other derived from the concern of the political community of which one is a 
member to participate in determining the scope of rights and their weight.  
 
Under a scheme of discordant parity, international and state norms and courts 
constantly compete with each other and assert their superiority over each other. 
Discordant parity gives expression both to the demand to publicly convey the fact 
that human rights are mandatory rather than discretionary, namely that the state 
has a duty to protect them and to the wish to facilitate the effective exercise of 
rights. The co-existence of the two layers is justified not (only or primarily) by its 
instrumental contribution to the protection of rights but also by the fact that the 
protection of rights is neither at the mercy of national constitutional courts nor 
detached or alienated from the local communities. Like Escher’s drawing, the two 
systems can be side by side, each controlling the other.  
The discordant parity paradigm developed here highlights the fact that delineating 
the scope of human rights is a deliberative enterprise based on competing ideals. 
Because of the parity, each norm-interpreter, be it either an international law or a 
domestic law interpreter, must give due account to the interpretation adopted by 
its national and international peers. The conflict between international and state 
norms respects human agency and therefore need not be resolved but in fact 
celebrated and even intensified. But at the same time, because interpreters must 
accept the relevancy and pertinence of the equivalent norms of the parallel and 
complementary body of law, they must consult the parallel sources with the view 
to accommodate them unless serious considerations suggest otherwise. 
Discordant parity should provide a guide for constitutional framers and for 
international lawyers. It suggests for example that it is wrong to strive for global 
constitutionalism or a global rule of law based on hierarchy, or endorse a 
constitutional provision (as the Netherlands has done) under which every 
requirement of international law becomes automatically part of the law of the 
state. It is also wrong to assume that state institutions can operate at the same 
time also as agents of the international system – what George Scelle termed in 
the 1930s “dedoublement fonctionnel” (dual functionality).63 Instead, to 
guarantee discordant parity, the state ought to seek to accommodate – but not to 
defer to -- the international order. Every state must assert its convictions and 
express its judgments even when they conflict with international law. Similarly, 
international tribunals ought also to maintain a degree of independence from the 
national courts.  
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Although as we showed above  international and national tribunals insist on 
supremacy or alternatively aim to mitigate or eliminate the tensions between 
their international and constitutional provisions, some courts seem to 
acknowledge the inevitable existence of such tensions. The European Court for 
instance acknowledged that in the sphere of education it “must … take into 
account the fact that Europe is marked by a great diversity between the States of 
which it is composed, particularly in the sphere of cultural and historical 
development.” But at the same time it rejected simple deference, when it 
“emphasise[d] that the reference to a tradition cannot relieve a Contracting State 
of its obligation to respect the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention 
and its Protocols.”64 Similarly, with respect to France’s ban on the burqa and 
niqab, the European Court stated that “It is also important to emphasize the 
fundamentally subsidiary role of the Convention mechanism. The national 
authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has held on 
many occasions, in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate 
local needs and conditions. In matters of general policy, on which opinions 
within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of the 
domestic policy-maker should be given special weight.”65 
Our analysis implies that the efforts to critique such doctrines as inherently 
unclear and imprecise fail, and, in fact, the efforts to clarify, specify and 
disambiguate those doctrines are inherently misguided. Clarity is the enemy of 
discordant parity. The pursuit of “hierarchy,” “harmony” and “order” between the 
international and the constitutional is fundamentally at odds with the idea that 
individual freedom is founded on friction and discordance.
66
  Hence it is 
important to acknowledge the justifiability of violation of international principles 
when international principles conflict with "countervailing normative principles 
relating to jurisdiction, procedure or outcomes."67 
 
The inherent conflicts characterizing human rights law are positive and even 
necessary for sustaining of human rights discourse. Further such conflicts consist 
not only in a conflict over what human rights are but also who the author of those 
rights is and consequently which institutions – international or constitutional – 
have authority to define their scope and determine their weight. The conflict 
between international and state norms need not be resolved; in fact it needs to be 
maintained and intensified. This conflict is a permanent and desirable feature of 
the legal world. Ironically, it is the resolution of the conflict which may 
undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional and international order. 
 
V. CONCLUSION  
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Discordant parity is founded on the conviction that the role of law in forming the 
social context within which states honor rights is a tricky one. Somehow the law 
must contribute to the creation of challenging demands from the state, while 
leaving also sufficient leeway so that states are free to become responsible for 
determining the content of rights. A hands-off approach by the law to questions of 
rights would abdicate any global responsibility for norms of justice; yet a tight, 
comprehensive supervision would remove from states the discretion to act and 
consequently undermine the willingness and the readiness to exercise rights.  
 
Internationalism is the institutional embodiment of the vision that states are bound 
by rights. The protection of rights is obligatory rather than discretionary and their 
mandatory force needs to be publicly acknowledged. The state need not only 
protect rights; it also needs to do it in a way that underscores the fact that it is 
obliged to do so. Internationalism provides the institutional tool to enable the state 
to do so. On the other hand, constitutionalism is also essential as the value of 
rights hinges on the exercise of rights and in order to facilitate and reinforce the 
exercise of rights, it is necessary that the polity participates actively in dictating 
what these rights are. If citizens are alienated from the process of determining 
what the rights are and what their weight is, they are less likely to actively 
exercise the rights. The solution – discordant parity -- challenges the tradition that 
is based on a strict hierarchy between international law and state law. Such parity 
implies constant tensions and conflicts between the international norms and state 
norms. This conflict is a permanent and desirable feature of the legal world. 
Ironically it is the urge to resolve this conflict – the urge to realize orderly 
harmony that ultimately may undermine the legitimacy of the constitutional and 
international order. 
 
 
 
